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Abstract
Let there be a positive (exogenous) probability that, at each date, the human species will disap-
pear. We postulate an Ethical Observer (EO) who maximizes intertemporal welfare under this
uncertainty, with expected-utility preferences. Various social welfare criteria entail alternative
von Neumann- Morgenstern utility functions for the EO: utilitarian, Rawlsian, and an extension
of the latter that corrects for the size of population. Our analysis covers, ﬁrst, a cake-eatingecon-
omy (without production), where the utilitarian and Rawlsian recommend the same allocation.
Second, a productive economywith education and capital, where it turns out that the recommen-
dations of the two EOs are in general diﬀerent. But when the utilitarian program diverges, then
we proveit is optimalfortheextendedRawlsian toignoretheuncertaintyconcerningthepossible
disappearance of the human species in the future. We conclude by discussing the implications
for intergenerational welfare maximization in the presence of global warming.
Keywords: Discounted utilitarianism, Rawlsian, sustainability, maximin, uncertainty, expected
utility, von Neumann-Morgenstern,dynamic welfare maximization.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: D63, D81, O40, Q54, Q56.
1. Introduction 1
We studytheproblemofintergenerationalwelfare maximizationwhenthe existenceoffuture 2
worlds is uncertain. One of the major examples of this problem today concerns global warming, 3
and howto structureresourceuse intertemporallyin its presence. The theoreticalissues raised by 4
uncertaintyare quitecomplex,andin the interestofclarity, we will studyonlytwo simplemodels 5
in this article – and neither of them explicitly models the eﬀect of production on the biosphere 6
and global temperature. In a companion paper (Llavador, Roemer, and Silvestre, 2009), we 7
study a more complex version of the second model of this article, which does take into account 8
the biosphere as a renewable resource: but that paper studies only the case with no uncertainty 9
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Asheim provided helpful comments. We thank the audiences in various presentations, in particular in the European
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some inferences for the more complex problem. 11
We studyseveral(intergenerational)socialwelfarefunctions: utilitarian,Rawlsian,‘extended 12
Rawlsian,’ and ‘Rawlsian with growth.’ The Rawlsian function is identiﬁed with the view of 13
sustainability, in a model with production.2 Sustainability, in our parlance, means sustaining 14
human welfare over time at the highest possible level. This is often called ‘weak sustainability,’ 15
to be contrasted with ‘strong sustainability’, which advocates sustaining the physical stock of 16
bio-resources – species variety, forests, and so on. (See, for instance, Neumayer, 2003, and 17
the articles in Asheim, 2007.) In another dimension, it is to be contrasted with the discounted- 18
utilitarian approach, which does not advocate sustaining human welfare over time, but rather the 19
maximization of a weighted sum of generational welfare levels. 20
There is a literature on Rawlsian social choice in the dynamic context, beginningwith Arrow 21
(1973), Dasgupta (1974), Solow (1974) and (Phelps and Riley, 1978). As far as we know, how- 22
ever, there is no literature on the Rawlsian problem when the existence of future generations is 23
uncertain. 24
In the next section, we introduce an Ethical Observer (EO) who has von Neumann – Mor- 25
genstern preferences over the future history of the world. These preferences can be utilitarian, 26
Rawlsian or extended Rawlsian. We show that the EO’s expected utility, evaluated at the lottery 27
which speciﬁes stochastically when the human species will come to an end, gives rise either to 28
‘discounted utilitarianism’ or ‘discounted sustainabilitarianism,’ depending on the EO’s prefer- 29
ences. We apply these criteria to two alternative economies. 30
First (Section 3), we consider a ‘cake-eating’ model: there is a single non-produced con- 31
sumption good that must be allocated over all future generations. The perhaps surprising result 32
is that the sustainabilitarian and the utilitarian recommend exactly the same solution to the cake- 33
eating problem (Theorem 1). Thus, these two apparently very diﬀerent social preference orders 34
do not diﬀer in their optimal choice in this simple economy. 35
We introduce in Section 4 a generalization of the classical Solow economic growth model. 36
There are two links between generations: investment, which determines the change in capital 37
stock, and education, which determines the transmission of skill to the next generation. It is 38
obvious that the utilitarian and sustainabilitarian cannot in general choose the same path in this 39
model, for with some parameter values, the discounted utilitarian program diverges, while the 40
discounted sustainabilitarian program always has a (ﬁnite) solution. Nevertheless, we show that 41
if the discounted utilitarian program converges, and if the initial capital-labor ratio of the econ- 42
omy is suﬃciently large, then the two programs do have the same solution (Corollary, Section 43
4.4). A fundamental result for this model is a Turnpike Theorem (Theorem 4), which we prove. 44
More important, perhaps, is the case when the discounted utilitarian program diverges – in- 45
deed, given the characterization of when this occurs (Theorem 5), this may be the empirically 46
salient case. The remarkableresult is that in this case, the solutionsof the discounted sustainabil- 47
itarian program (in the sense of the extended Rawlsian EO) and undiscounted sustainabilitarian 48
program are identical (Theorem 6). This case occurs when the economy is suﬃciently produc- 49
tive, and the result says that great productivity renders it optimal for the sustainabilitarian EO to 50
ignore the uncertainty concerning the possible disappearance of the human species in the future. 51
We consider this the most important result of our analysis. 52
2Calling the intergenerational welfare function ‘Rawlsian’ may lead to some confusion. We mean ‘maximin’ applied
to the society consisting of an inﬁnite number of generations. It is well known that Rawls himself, however, did not
advocate ‘maximin’ for the intergenerational problem.
2Some readers may ﬁnd ‘sustainability,’ as we model it, too stark, as it precludes the increase 53
in the welfare of the representative generational agent over time. In Section 4.5, we introduce 54
growth, and study optimal paths when it is speciﬁed that welfare should grow at some exoge- 55
nously speciﬁed rate g over time. 56
As noted above, when the initial capital-labor ratio is above a certain lower bound, the dis- 57
counted utilitarian and sustainabilitarian programs have the same solution. In the Appendix we 58
computean exampleshowinghowthe optimalpaths of these two programsdiﬀerwhen the initial 59
capital-labor ratio is below this bound and the utilitarian program converges. 60
In Section 4.6, we focus upon the case when the discounted utilitarian program diverges, 61
and we note that, if an overtaking criterion is applied to order divergent paths, then the EO 62
would recommend almost starving the early generations. We contrast this with the discounted 63
sustainabilitiarian, who in this case recommends equal utility for all future generations. We ﬁnd 64
the latter recommendation much more appealing. 65
Section 5 concludesand oﬀers some conjectures about the generalizationof our results to the 66
problem of intertemporal distribution in presence of global warming. 67
2. Ethical Observers 68
Consider an economy that will exist for an inﬁnite number of generations; there is one repre- 69
sentative agent at each date. Denote the generic utility stream by (u1,u2,...) ≡ {ut}∞
t=1. 70
Let P be an abstract set of feasible inﬁnite utility streams, which may depend on a vector of 71
initial conditions. A social welfare functionis a real-valuedfunctionwith domain P. If the social 72
welfare function of the planner,whom we call an Ethical Observer (EO), is Ω : P → ℜ, then she 73
maximizes Ω(u1,u2,...) on P. 74
For example, if the EO is utilitarian, then her maximization program is 75
Program U. max
 ∞
t=1 ut subject to (u1,u2,...) ∈ P. 76
If the EO is a Rawlsian maximinner(i. e., sustainabilitarian),then her maximizationprogram 77
is 78
maxinf{u1,u2,...} subjectto(u1,u2,...) ∈ P,
which can also be written: 79
Program SUS. maxΛ subject to (u1,u2,...) ∈ P,ut ≥ Λ,∀t ≥ 1. 80
“SUS” stands for sustainability: the economy is sustainable if it chooses a path that guar- 81
antees a certain level of human welfare forever. Note that in programs U and SUS there is no 82
uncertainty concerning the existence of future generations. 83
We now introduce uncertainty by assuming that there is an exogenous probability p ∈ (0,1) 84
that mankind will become extinct at each date, if it has not done so already. 85
The exogeneity of p is a simplifying assumption: in many realistic applications, such as 86
climate change, the policies adopted may well alter the probabilities of survival of mankind. 87
Our postulate of an exogenous p implies that the EO cannot inﬂuence the length T of human 88
history, i. e., the size of populationacross time, allowing us to focus on choosingpotential utility 89
levels, while T is randomly variable but exogenous. Whether a generation exists or not is, in our 90
model, independent of the choices of the EO, enabling us to sidestep the well-known dilemmas 91
of population ethics (see, e. g., Parﬁt, 1982, 1984). 92
3We suppose that the preferences of the EO satisfy the expected utility hypothesis. An out- 93
come (or ‘prize’) is deﬁned by a date T, interpreted as the last date before extinction, and a util- 94
ity vector (u1,u2,...,uT). Accordingly, her von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) utility function 95
is deﬁned on outcomes (T;u1,u2,...,uT), with vNM utility values W(T;u1,u2,...,uT). Under 96
our assumption of exogenous probabilities, the EO’s choice of a path (u1,u2,...) ∈ P deﬁnes a 97
lottery with expected utility 98




(1 − p)t−1W(t;u1,u2,.,ut). (1)






and the expected utility of (u1,u2,...) is 101
pu1 + (1 − p)p(u1 + u2) + (1 − p)
2p(u1 + u2 + u3) + ... (2)
By grouping the terms in (2), it becomes 102
u1p(1 + (1 − p) + (1 − p)2 + ...)+
u2(1 − p)p(1+ (1 − p) + (1 − p)2 + ...) +
u3(1 − p)
2p(1 + (1 − p) + (1 − p)






This immediately justiﬁes the view that the utilitarian Ethical Observer should be, in the 103




t=1 ϕt−1ut subject to (u1,u2,...) ∈ P, with ϕ ≡ 1 − p. 106
We believe this is, indeed, the most solid justiﬁcation for the discounted-utilitarian ethic.3
107
Note, however,that the discount factor, ϕ ≡ 1−p, should be very close to one, assuming that p is 108
very close to zero.4 Indeed, we cannot justify, using this approach, the relatively small discount 109
factors that are often used in intergenerational welfare economics. 110
3Many economists attempt to justify the use of a discount factor on the grounds that individuals discount the utility
they will receive at a later period in their lives. This fact can only justify using such a (subjective) discount factor in the
context of a model with an inﬁnite number of generations if we view the problem as isomorphic to a problem in which
there is a single, inﬁnitely lived agent. We cannot accept the plausibility of such an isomorphism. Just because an indi-
vidual may today discount his future utility does not imply that ethical observers, today, are entitled to discount the utility
of future generations. This point was clearly stated by Ramsey (1928) in his pioneering work on the theory of saving,
who wrote, “One point should be emphasized more particularly; we do not discount later enjoyments in comparison with
earlier ones, a practice which is ethically indefensible and arises merely from weakness of the imagination; we shall,
however, in Section II, include such a rate of discount in some of our investigations.”
4Indeed the Stern Review (2007) chooses ϕ = 0.999 per annum, which we believe is reasonable. Nordhaus (2008),
on the contrary, uses the low discount factor 0.985.
4On the other hand, suppose that the EO is Rawlsian (or sustainabilitarian): she wishes to 111
maximize the minimum utility of all individuals who ever live. In this case her vNM utility 112
function is 113
WR(T;u1,...,uT) = min{u1,u2,...,uT}, (4)
and her expected utility associated with the path (u1,u2,...) is p
 ∞
t=1(1 − p)t−1 min{u1,...,ut}. 114
Her optimization program is then the following one. 115
Program R. max p
 ∞
t=1(1 − p)t−1 min{u1,...,ut} subject to (u1,u2,...) ∈ P. 116
Klaus Nehring, Andreu Mas-Colell and Geir Asheim have objected (in private communica- 117
tions) to (4) for the following reason. Interpreting the vNM values as ex post utilities, the EO 118
will never ex post prefer a longer time span to a shorter one with the same utility values for 119
the dates present in both, i. e., she will ex post weakly prefer the outcome (T; ¯ u1,..., ¯ uT) to 120
the outcome (T + τ; ¯ u1,..., ¯ uT,uT+1,...,uT+τ), and she will actually prefer the shorter one if 121
ut < min{¯ u1,..., ¯ uT} for some t > T. Consider for instance the outcomes (5; ¯ u, ¯ u, ¯ u, ¯ u, ¯ u − ε) and 122
(4; ¯ u, ¯ u, ¯ u, ¯ u). In the second case, humans disappear at date 5; in the ﬁrst case, at date 6, and the 123
last generationhas almost the utility of the previousones. Yet the EO underformulation(4) must 124
ex post prefer the second, shorter outcome. Note that this preferenceviolates the “mere addition” 125
desideratum in Parﬁt’s population ethics (Parﬁt, 1982). 126
As indicated, the diﬃculty is not critical under our assumption of an exogenous p, because 127
our EO chooses, ex ante, lotteries with ﬁxed probabilities, rather than outcomes. For instance, 128
under our assumption of constant, exogenous probability, the EO would certainly choose the 129
lottery (¯ u, ¯ u, ¯ u, ¯ u, ¯ u − ε,0,0,...) over the lottery (¯ u, ¯ u, ¯ u, ¯ u,0,0,0,...). But the problem would 130
become serious were p endogenous. Indeed,the well-knowncriticisms of the maximin approach 131
become more telling in the presence of an endogenously variable population. 132
Nehring’s suggestion is that we modify the vNM utility function to be 133
W
N(T;u1,...,uT) = T min{u1,u2,.,uT}. (5)
Thus, in the example just given, the EO would ex post prefer the ﬁrst outcome as long as ε < 134
¯ u
5. Formulation (5) confers a powerful role to the length T of human history. But this too could 135
be problematic were the probability of extinction endogenous and, accordingly, the EO could 136
inﬂuence T: the resulting tradeoﬀ between T and the sustainable utility level min{u1,u2,.,uT} 137
could then lead to Parﬁt’s (1984) “repugnant conclusion.”5
138
More generally, the EO may adopt a vNM utility function of the form 139
Wβ(T;u1,...,uT) = (1 + (T − 1)β)min{u1,u2,.,uT}, (6)
with β ∈ [0,1], which reduces to (4) when β = 0 and to (5) when β = 1. An EO with the vNM 140
utility function of (6) will be called an Extended Rawlsian EO. 141
We study the optimization programs of the various EO’s in two particular economic models: 142
the cake-eating economy, and the education and capital economy, which yield quite diﬀerent 143
results. We will say that two programs are equivalent if one possesses a solution if and only if 144
the other possesses a solution, and when both possess a solution, the solutions are the same. 145
5We are indebted to the referee for this comment.
5Our main result in the cake-eating economy is the equivalence between programs DU and 146
R: the Rawlsian (or sustainabilitarian) ethical observer and the utilitarian ethical observer make 147
identical choices in the presence of uncertain future worlds. 148
In the educationandcapital economy,Program DU may divergeor converge: our main result 149
there is that, if DU diverges, then, for any β ∈ [0,1], the EO’s optimization problem under the 150
vNM of (6), which, as noted, includesas special case ProgramR, is equivalentto the uncertainty- 151
free program SUS: the Extended Rawlsian EO can then ignore uncertainty. 152
We conclude this section with a lemma. 153
Lemma 1. If “(uR
1,uR
2,...) solves Program R ⇒ uR
t ≥ uR
t+1,∀t ≥ 1” and “(uDU
1 ,uDU
2 ,...) solves 154
Program DU ⇒ uDU
t ≥ uDU
t+1,∀t ≥ 1,” then Programs R and DU are equivalent. 155
Proof. Note that min{u1,u2,.,ut} = ut, ∀t ≥ 1, if and only if ut ≥ ut+1,∀t ≥ 1, in which case the 156
objective function of Program R is p
 ∞
t=1(1 − p)t−1ut, and Program R can be rewritten as 157
Program CDU. max p
 ∞
t=1(1 − p)t−1ut subject to ut ≥ ut+1,∀t ≥ 1 and (u1,u2,...) ∈ P. 158
The objective function of Program CDU is that of Program DU multiplied by the positive 159
constant p. If “(uDU
1 ,uDU
2 ,...) solves Program DU ⇒ uDU
t ≥ uDU
t+1,∀t ≥ 1,” then the constraints 160
ut ≥ ut+1 can be added to Program DU, which then becomes equivalent to Program CDU. 161
Remark. Lemma 1 cannot cover the Extended Rawlsian EO with β > 0, who has a diﬀerent 162
objective function. 163
3. The cake-eating economy 164
Postulateaneconomywithasinglegood,non-producibleandinitiallyavailableintheamount 165
ω. A consumption path is written (y1,y2,...), where yt is the consumption of the agent (or 166
generation) alive at date t. For t = 1,2,... , the utility function of Agent t is denoted ˜ u : ℜ+ → 167
ℜ : yt  → ˜ u(yt),andassumedtobeincreasing. Hence, aconsumptionpath(y1,y2,...)inducesthe 168
utility path (u1,u2,...) = (˜ u(y1), ˜ u(y2),...). Taking ω = 1, the set of feasible consumption paths 169
is ℑ ≡ {(y1,y2,...) ∈ ℜ∞
+ :
 ∞
t=1 yt ≤ 1}, with the set of feasible utility paths P = {(u1,u2,...) ∈ 170
ℜ∞ : ∃(y1,y2,...) ∈ ℑ such that ut = ˜ u(yt),∀t ≥ 1}. 171




t=1 ϕt−1˜ u(yt) subject to
 
yt ≤ 1,yt ≥ 0, ∀t ≥ 1. 174
Lemma 2. If (yDU
1 ,yDU
2 ,...) solves Program DU1, then yDU
t ≥ yDU
t+1,∀t ≥ 1. 175
Proof. Suppose that for some T,yDU
T+1 > yDU
T . Then switch these two terms, and the new policy 176
strictly dominates (yDU
1 ,yDU
2 ,...), because the coeﬃcients of the objective function of DU1 are 177
strictly decreasing. Contradiction. 178








yt ≤ 1, yt ≥ 0, ∀t ≥ 1.
6Lemma 3. If (yR
1,yR
2,...) solves Program R1, then yR
t ≥ yR
t+1,∀t ≥ 1. 180
Proof. Appendix. 181
Theorem 1. Programs DU1 and R1 are equivalent, and yt ≥ yt+1,∀t ≥ 1, at any solution. 182
Proof. Immediate from Lemmas 1-3. 183
Theorem 1, perhaps surprisingly, tells us that the Rawlsian EO behaves just like a discounted 184
utilitarian –and uses the same discount factor. 185
We now analyze the (common) solutions to programs DU1 and R1. 186
Theorem2. Let ˜ ubeconcave,diﬀerentiableonℜ++ andincreasing,andsupposethatlimy→0 ˜ u′(y) 187
= ∞ (i. e., ˜ u satisﬁes an “Inada condition”). If (yDU
1 ,yDU
2 ,...) solves Program DU1, then 188
yDU
t > 0 for all t. 189
Proof. Appendix. 190
Example 1 in the Appendix provides a utility function ˜ u : ℜ2
++ → ℜ (concave, increasing, 191
diﬀerentiable) for which programs DU1 and R1 do not possess a solution. 192
The next theorem studies the case when the derivative of ˜ u at zero is ﬁnite. 193
Theorem 3. Let ˜ u be strictly concave, increasing, and diﬀerentiable on ℜ+, with ˜ u′(0) = γ < ∞. 194
Then Program R1 possesses a unique solution (yR
1,yR
2,...), and there is a date T such that yR
t = 0 195
for all t ≥ T. 196
Proof. Appendix. 197
We may thus summarize as follows, for functions ˜ u which are strictly concave, increasing, 198
and diﬀerentiable except perhaps at zero: 199
1. When programs DU1 or R1 have a solution, then the solution is unique and identical: the 200
Rawlsian EO and the discounted utilitarian EO make exactly the same recommendation 201
(Theorems 1-3). 202
2. If ˜ u′(0) < ∞, then a solution to programs DU1 and R1 does exist. Furthermore, there is a 203
T such that the optimal policy awards zero resource to all dates t ≥ T: both the Rawlsian 204
EO andthe discountedutilitarian EO prescribezeroconsumptionfor all suﬃcientlydistant 205
generations (Theorems 1-3). 206
3. If limy→0 ˜ u′(y) = ∞, and if there is a solution to programs DU1 and R1, then the solution 207
implies yt > 0 for all t: both the Rawlsian EO and the discounted utilitarian EO prescribe 208
positive consumption for all generations (Theorems 1-2). 209
4. There are functions ˜ u : ℜ2
++ → ℜ with limy→0 ˜ u(y) = −∞ for which programs DU1 or R1 210
have no solution. But if ˜ u′(yt) does not approach inﬁnity too fast as yt approaches zero, 211
then a solution exists (see Example 1 and its discussion in the Appendix). 212
74. An economy with education and capital 213
4.1. The model 214
At date t, the available amount of labor, measured in skill units and denoted xt, is partitioned 215
into three parts: leisure (xl
t), labor used in the production of commodities (xc
t) and labor used 216
to educate the next generation (xe
t). Utility depends on consumption (ct) and leisure, and is 217







t) and labor produce output according to the production function f(sk
t, xc
t): output is 219




++. Given the initial endowment, a path for the economic variables is feasible if it 221
satisﬁes the following inequalities for ∀t ≥ 1: 222
(1 − δ)s
k
t−1 + it ≥ s
k
t (law of motion of capital), where δ ∈ (0,1) is the depreciation rate,
f(sk
t, xc










The last inequality models the technology of education: the quantity of skilled labor at the 223
next date t is simply a multiple ξ of the eﬃciency units of labor devoted to teaching at date t −1. 224
Thus ξ , which will turn out to be a keyparameter,is the rate at which skilled laborcan reproduce 225
itself intergenerationally,or, in another locution, the student-teacher ratio. 226
The problem is non-traditional in one way: utility depends not upon raw leisure but upon 227
educated leisure. Thus, we assume that a person’s leisure activities are more fulﬁlling, if she 228
is more highly educated. One might challenge this as an elitist view, but we insist upon it, 229
as we believe that education opens up for the individual increasing opportunities for the use of 230
leisure. We maythinkofeducationas permittingthe diversiﬁcationoftheleisure resource,which 231
increases its usefulness. In the words of Martin Wolf (2007): 232
The ends people desire are, instead, what makes the means they employ valuable. 233
Ends should always come above the means people use. The question in education 234
is whether it, too, can be an end in itself and not merely a means to some other end 235
– a better job, a more attractive mate or even, that holiest of contemporary grails, a 236
more productive economy. 237
The answer has to be yes. The search for understanding is as much a deﬁning char- 238
acteristic of humanityas is the search for beauty. It is, indeed, far more of a deﬁning 239
characteristic than the search for food or for a mate. Anybody who denies its intrin- 240
sic value also denies what makes us most fully human. 241
On the role of education in production, we are reminded of the recent work of Goldin and 242
Katz (2008), who argue that the main reason for the excellent performance of the American 243
economy in the twentieth century was universal education. Similar points have been made with 244
respect to South Korea and Japan. Of course, the Goldin-Katz claim is somewhat diﬀerent from 245
ours –theirs is based on the growth of consumption, while ours is based on the centrality of the 246
educational technology for growth of welfare. 247
We impose the following assumption. The Cobb-Douglas hypotheses could be dispensed 248
with in some of the results, but we adopt them for convenience and to shorten some of the 249
arguments. 250
8Assumption A. 251
(a) Cobb-Douglas Utility Function: u(c, xl) = cα(xl)1−α,α ∈ (0,1); 252
(b) Cobb-Douglas Production Function: f(sk, xc) = (sk)θ(xc)1−θ,θ ∈ (0,1); 253
(c) ξ > 1. 254
The sustainability program SUS specializes to Program SUS2[xe
0, sk
0], as follows, in the edu- 255






t) ≥ Λ, t ≥ 1,
(at) (1 − δ)s
k
t−1 + it ≥ s
k
t, t ≥ 1,
(bt) f(sk
t, xc





t, t ≥ 1.
We have written the dual variables in parentheses for future use. 257
We state a turnpike theorem for the SUS2 program. 258
Theorem 4 (Turnpike Theorem). 259
A. There is a ray Γ ∈ ℜ2
+ such that, if (xe
0, sk
0) ∈ Γ, then the solution path of Program 260
SUS2[xe
0, sk
0] is stationary. 261
B. If (xe
0, sk





to a point in Γ. 263
C. Along the solution path, all constraints hold with equality (in particular, utility is constant 264
over t). 265
D. The solution to SUS2[xe
0, sk
0] is unique. 266
Proof. Appendix. 267
Figure 1 illustrates the TurnpikeTheorem. The solutionpath determinedby initial conditions 268
oﬀ ray Γ has constant utility, and it has the propertythat, along this path, the sequence converges 269
to a point in Γ. 270
4.2. Discounted utilitarianism: the convergence condition ϕ < 1/ξ 271
The discounted utilitarian program DU of Section 2 specializes to program DU2[ϕ, xe
0, sk
0], 272
















t−1 + it ≥ sk






































Figure 1: Convergence to ray Γ
Note that whether or not DU2[ϕ, xe
0, sk
0] converges depends only on ϕ and the initial ‘capital- 274
labor ratio’ σ = sk
0/xe
0, by the homogeneityof the program. (The set of feasible paths is a convex 275
cone.) We are interested in understanding the set
 






A. If ϕξ > 1, then Program DU2[ϕ, xe
0,σxe








B. If ϕξ < 1, then Program DU2[ϕ, xe
0,σxe





Theorem 5 is important for our theory, and perhaps surprising, for it says that the ‘power’ of 281
the economy, in the sense of its capacity to cause the DU2 program to diverge, depends only on 282
the eﬃciency of the educational technology, namely, the coeﬃcient ξ. In particular, we need no 283
special assumptions on the technology f other than the standard ones in Assumption A. 284
The proof of Theorem 5 is not particularly transparent, and so we provide here a more intu- 285
itive argument. Let xe
0 = 1. Suppose we can ﬁnd positive numbers (σ,c,i, xc, xl) such that the 286
following equations hold for some given positive g: 287
(g + δ)σ = i, (7)
f(σ, xc) = c + i, (8)
ξ = 1 + g + xc + xl. (9)
Then, from an initial endowment of (xe
0, sk
0) = (1,σ), we can produce a balanced growth path 288
in which all variables grow by a rate g at each period. Just notice that the investment deﬁned 289
by (7) will make sk
1 = (1 + g)σ, that equation (9) says that xe
1 = (1 + g)xe
0, and that the solution 290
10(c,i, xc, xl) will grow at rate g from date one onwards, invoking the fact that all three equations 291
are homogeneousof degree one in the ﬁve variables. Now, in order to solve these equations, it is 292
obviously necessary that 1+g < ξ, for otherwise (9) would have no positive solution for (xc, xl). 293
The interesting fact is that the converse is true as well: as long as 1 + g < ξ, we can produce 294
the required solution, which would support a balanced growth path at growth rate g beginning at 295
a capital-labor ratio σ. To see this, eliminate i using (7) (which will surely be positive for any 296
positive σ); then we must ﬁnd (σ,c, xc, xl) positive such that: 297
f(σ, xc) = c + (g + δ)σ,
ξ − (1 + g) = x
c + x
l,
which is equivalent to ﬁnding (σ, xc) such that 298
f(σ, xc) > (g + δ)σ,
0 < xc < ξ − (1 + g).
But this can be accomplished if and only if there exists σ > 0 such that 299
f(σ,ξ − (1 + g)) > (g + δ)σ,




ξ − (1 + g)
σ
 
> g + δ.
But since f increases without bound as we increase its labor argument, we can surely ﬁnd σ 301




laborratio ˆ σinaﬁnitenumberofsteps; fromtherewetakeoﬀatanydesiredgrowthrateg < ξ−1. 304
Since utility is also homogenous of degree one in (c, xl), it grows at that rate too. So the growth 305
factor of utility is (1 + g) < ξ. It is now clear that Program DU2 diverges if and only if ϕξ > 1. 306
The reason the above argument is only an intuition for, rather than a proof of, Theorem 5, is 307
that a proof cannot limit itself to studying only balanced growth paths. 308
We remind the reader that Theorem 5 depends, as well, on our assumption that the leisure ar- 309
gument of the utility function is measured in quality units, one that we strongly defend, although 310
it may be somewhat controversial. 311
4.3. The divergence of discounted utilitarianism and the sustainability of the extended Rawlsian 312
path 313
Consider the Extended Rawlsian EO, i. e., with vNM utility function given by (6) above, 314







u1 + ϕ(1 + β)min{u1,u2} + ϕ2(1 + 2β)min{u1,u2,u3} + ...
 








t−1 + it ≥ s
k
t, t ≥ 1,
f(sk
t, xc









t, t ≥ 1.
11Lemma 4. For any path (u1,u2,...) ∈ ℜ∞
+ , the sum
 ∞
t=1 ϕt−1 (1 + (t − 1)β)min{u1,...,ut} 317
converges. 318
Proof. Appendix. 319
Lemma 5. If (u1,u2,...) solves Program Rβ[ϕ, sk
0, xe
0], then ut ≥ ut+1 for all t. 320
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that u2 > u1. Then it follows that u1 = min{u1,u2}. We can 321
distribute back a small amount of resources from date 2 to date 1: reduce by a small amount ε 322
thevalueof xe
1, increase xl
1 byε, anddecrease xl
2 byξε, makingthedate2agenttakethereduction 323
of his skilled labor supply entirely in a reduction of leisure. This will increase the values of u1 324
and (1+β)min{u1,u2} and will leave all other numbers (1 + (t − 1)β)min{u1,...,ut} unchanged 325
or possibly greater. Hence, since the objective was ﬁnite by Lemma 4, it is now increased, a 326
contradiction. The general claim follows from an induction argument. 327
We now state our main theorem: 328
Theorem 6. Let (xe
0, sk
0) ∈ Γ. If ϕξ ≥ 1, then for β ∈ [0,1], any solution to Program Rβ[ϕ, xe
0, sk
0] 329
is the solution to Program SUS2[xe
0, sk
0]. Since the solution to SUS2[xe
0, sk
0] is unique, so is the 330




Combinedwith Theorem5, we have that, if Program DU2 diverges,then the ExtendedRawl- 333
sian EO can ignore uncertainty in choosing the optimal path (at least in the case when the initial 334
endowment vector lies on the ray Γ). We conjecture that Theorem 6 is true even if the initial 335
endowment is not on the ray Γ. 336
4.4. The case where discounted utilitarianism converges 337
This section focuses on the case β = 0, for which Program Rβ is just the application of the 338
Rawlsian Program R of Section 2 above to the education and capital economy: let us refer to 339
it as Program R2[ϕ, xe
0, sk
0], or simply Program R2. We expect that, if ϕξ < 1, then the solution 340
to Program R2 will not be the solution to Program SUS2, which is to say that the inequalities 341
ut ≥ ut+1 of Lemma 5 will not all be satisﬁed with equality. Thus, the solution to the Rawlsian 342
EO’s problemunder uncertaintyR2 may involve decreasingutilities overtime. Indeedthis is true 343
for ϕ suﬃciently close to zero, as the following simple result shows. 344
Theorem 7. Given (xe
0, sk
0), there is a number ¯ ϕ > 0 such that, if ϕ < ¯ ϕ, then the solution to 345
R2[ϕ, xe
0, sk
0] entails u1 > u2 on the solution path. 346
Proof. Appendix. 347
Moreover,a consequence of Theorem 8 below is that, under our Cobb-Douglas assumptions, 348
for any ϕ < 1/ξ, if the capital-labor ratio sk
0/xe
0 is suﬃciently high, then utilities are strictly 349
monotone decreasing on the optimal path. 350
We now ask: If the DU2[ϕ, xe
0, sk
0] program converges,is its solution the same as the solution 351
to R2[ϕ, xe
0, sk
0]? By lemmas 1 and 5, this will be the case if, at the solution to DU2[ϕ, xe
0, sk
0], 352
utilities are weakly decreasing with time. 353
12For an initial condition (sk
0, xe
0), deﬁne the ‘capital-labor ratio’ σ0 = sk
0/xe
0. Recall that 354
u(c, x) = cαx1−α, and f(s, x) = sθx1−θ. Deﬁne the following variables: 355
E = (ϕξ)1/(αθ)(1 − δ),
˜ xc
1 =












t = (1 − δ)tsk
0, ˜ xc
t = ˜ xc
1Et−1, ˜ xl
t = ˜ xl
1Et−1, ˜ ct = ˜ c1((1 − δ)θE1−θ)t−1.
Theorem 8. Supposethat ϕξ < 1, and that sk
0/xe











(ϕξ)1/(αθ) θ(1 − α)
σ(1 − αθ)
.
Then the solution to DU2[ϕ, xe
0, sk
0] is given by the geometric sequence: sk
t = ˜ sk
t xe
0, xe




t = ˜ xl
txe
0, xc
t = ˜ xc
t xe
0, it = 0 for all t ≥ 1. 358
Proof. Appendix. 359
Corollary. If ϕξ < 1 and σ0 ≥ σ∗, then Programs DU2[ϕ, xe
0, sk




Proof. Along the solution to Program DU2, we have that 362
˜ ut = ˜ u1
  
(1 − δ)θE1−θ α
E1−α t−1
,
where ˜ u1 = ˜ cα
1(˜ xl
1)1−α; thus utilities are strictly decreasing with time because E < 1. The result 363
then follows from lemmas 1 and 5. 364
What happens when σ0 < σ∗? The solution to DU2 will not be the well-behaved solution 365
of geometric decay of Theorem 8. Will, nevertheless, utilities still be monotone decreasing on 366
the optimal path? Perhaps, surprisingly, the answer is in general negative. Example 2 in the 367
Appendix has the property that, along the solution path to Program DU2, u2 > u1, whereas the 368
utilities from date 2 onwards decay geometrically as in Theorem 8. 369
How do the solutions to DU2 and R2 compare when they are diﬀerent and DU2 converges? 370
To see this, we calculate the solution to R2 for Example 2 in the Appendix. There, the Rawlsian 371
EO gives higher utility to the ﬁrst generation than the utilitarian EO, but the reverse is true for all 372
dates after that. In fact, the ratio of utilities for the two programs is constant for dates 2 and later 373
at 1.015, with the larger utility associated with DU2: this is perhaps a surprise. 374
This concludes our discussion of the relationship between the DU2 and R2 programs in the 375
case where DU2 converges. Unlike the cake-eating problem, the solutions to these two pro- 376
grams are not always identical –although they are identical when the initial capital-labor ratio is 377
suﬃciently large. 378
Based on Example 2 in the Appendix, we may conjecture what the general solution to 379
DU2[ϕ, xe
0, sk
0] looks like in the convergent case. There will be a sequence of numbers ˜ σ > 380
σ∗ > σ1 > σ2 >     > 0, where σ∗ is given in Theorem 8, where, if σT > σ0 > σT+1, the ﬁrst 381
T dates will have it > 0, and at date T + 1, the capital-labor ratio will be ˜ σ, at which point the 382
geometric-decay solution of Theorem 8 takes over. The same pattern should be true in the solu- 383
tion to Program R2[ϕ, xe
0, sk
0], except that utility will be equal for all the dates when investment is 384
positive. 385
134.5. Growth 386
Some may ﬁnd sustainability, in the sense of program SUS, to be too stark, as it leads to 387
a constant level of human welfare until the disappearance of the species. If, however, we treat 388
resources, such as the biosphere, as of limited capacity, then sustainability may be the best we 389






t) ≥ (1 + g)t−1Λ, t ≥ 1,
[(at)] f(sk
t, xc
t) ≥ ct + it, t ≥ 1,
[(bt)] (1 − δ)sk
t−1 + it ≥ sk





t, t ≥ 1.
Program g-SUS maximizes date-1 welfare subject to assuring that welfare grows at rate g 391
forever. Obviously, Program g-SUS becomes SUS2 when g = 0. 392
Whatis the largestgforwhichProgramg-SUSpossesses asolution? We giveapartialanswer 393
with the next theorem. 394
Deﬁnition. A balancedgrowth pathat rate g is a pathsatisfying the (at), (bt) and (dt) constraints 395
of Program g-SUS[xe
0, sk
0] such that: 396
sk
t = (1 + g)sk
t−1 and xe
t = (1 + g)xe
t−1, for t ≥ 1,






, for t ≥ 2.
Theorem 9. Suppose that 0 ≤ g < ξ − 1 and xe
0 = 1. Then there exists a value sk
0 such that the 397
solution to Program g-SUS[xe
0, sk
0] is a balanced growth path at rate g. Conversely, if g ≥ ξ − 1, 398




We expect that a turnpike theorem holds for the g-SUS model as well, and so, if and only if 401
0 ≤ g < ξ − 1, and given any value of sk
0, Program g-SUS will possess a solution at which all 402
constraints bind, which converges to a balanced growth path at rate g. 403
4.6. Social choice when DU2[ϕ, xe
0, sk
0] diverges 404
According to Theorem 5, DU2[ϕ, xe
0, sk
0] diverges when ϕξ > 1. The usual way of choosing 405
among paths in the case of divergence is to use a version of the overtaking criterion: the latest 406
proposal that we have seen along these lines is that of Basu and Mitra (2007). The utility path 407
(¯ ¯ u1, ¯ ¯ u2,...) is at least as goodasthe utility path(¯ u1, ¯ u2,...) accordingto the overtakingcriterion 408
if there exists a T such that
 T−1
t=1 ϕt−1¯ ¯ ut ≥
 T−1
1 ϕt−1¯ ut and t ≥ T ⇒ ¯ ¯ ut ≥ ¯ ut. This deﬁnes a pre- 409
order (i. e., an incomplete order) on feasible paths when a program diverges. 410
TheproofofTheorem9showedthatbalancedgrowthpathsexistfortheeducationandcapital 411
economy as long as g < ξ − 1. The condition for a divergence of such a path in Program DU2 is 412
ϕ(1+g) ≥ 1. This conditionsurely holds when g is close to ξ−1 because ϕ(1+(ξ−1)) = ϕξ > 1. 413
6We are not interested in the problem with negative g.
14Let (¯ u1, ¯ u2,...) and (¯ ¯ u1, ¯ ¯ u2,...) be two feasible balanced-growth paths for a given initial 414
endowment (xe
0, sk
0) which grow at rates g1 and g2, respectively, where g2 > g1. It is easy to see 415
that (¯ ¯ u1, ¯ ¯ u2,...) is better than the utility path (¯ u1, ¯ u2,...) according to the overtaking criterion. 416
But it is also the case that utility will be smaller for the early date(s) on the preferred path. (To 417
grow forever faster requires making early sacriﬁces.) This is interesting, because discounted 418
utilitarianism is usually associated with implying that the later generations sustain low utility. 419
This, however, is only the case when the program converges. Indeed, as the proof of Theorem 9 420
shows, as the growthrate g approachesits unattainablesupremum(ξ−1) (andthese high-growth- 421
rate paths are the most desirable paths according to the overtaking criterion), the utility of the 422
ﬁrst generation approaches zero. We do not take this as a criticism of overtaking: rather, it is a 423
criticism of discounted utilitarianism. 424
In contrast, as Theorem 6 showed, if ϕξ ≥ 1, then the solution to Program R2[ϕ, xe
0, sk
0] 425
entails constant utility for all generations, at the highest possible level at which such a level can 426
be sustained. We ﬁnd this distinctly superior, from the ethical viewpoint, to the recommendation 427
of the discounted utilitarian. 428
Finally, we note that the case of divergence may be the salient one. By deﬁnition, ξ = 429
xt/xe
t−1 = xt/(τext−1), where τe is the fraction of the labor force of generationt−1 that is devoted 430
to teaching. As a rough approximation, assume that population growth is zero and that skill 431
growth is zero; then xt = xt−1 and so, if τe ≈ 0.05, we have ξ ≈ 20. Since we have suggested, 432
following Stern (2007), that ϕ = 0.999is appropriate,we have that ϕξ is substantially larger than 433
one. 434
5. Conclusion 435
In the cake-eating problem, we showed that two Ethical Observers, facing uncertain possible 436
future worlds, who have utilitarian and Rawlsian von Neumann Morgenstern preferences over 437
risk, respectively, would recommend the same allocation of the exhaustible resource over future 438
generations. At ﬁrst blush, it seems surprising that these two Observers, with apparently very 439
diﬀerent preferences, would agree on the recommended path. The best analogy we can think 440
of is with the solution to the problem with no uncertainty concerning the existence of future 441
generations, and a ﬁnite horizon. The utilitarian and the Rawlsian will recommend the same 442
allocation of the exhaustible resourcein this case –namely, split it equally among all generations. 443
This solution is unique only if u is strictly concave –if u is linear, then the utilitarian is indiﬀerent 444
among all possible distributions of the resource. 445
We then introduced a generalization of the classical growth model, which includes an educa- 446
tion sector. Moreover, we postulated that welfare depends on consumption and educated leisure. 447
Now, the program of the utilitarian Ethical Observer, in the presence of uncertainty, does not 448
always converge, while the program of the sustainabilitarian (i. e., Rawlsian) does. We charac- 449
terized when the former program converges (Theorem 5), and we showed that when it does not 450
converge, the (extended) sustainabilitarian proposes the same path as she would if there were 451
no uncertainty (Theorem 6). We believe this is an important result, as parameter values in the 452
real world are likely to be such that the discounted utilitarian program does not converge (see 453
Section 4.6). Moreover, we argued that if this is the case, then the most desirable paths accord- 454
ing to the discounted-utilitarianobjective would leave the early generations with very low utility. 455
(This conclusion is very diﬀerent from the recommendation of discounted utilitarianism in the 456
convergent case.) In contrast, when the discounted utilitarian program diverges, as we said, the 457
sustainabilitarian recommends equal welfare for all generations. 458
15Finally, we showedthatwhen thediscountedutilitarianprogramconverges,it is notgenerally 459
the case that the two Ethical Observers will recommend the same paths, although they do if 460
the capital-labor ratio of the initial endowment vector is suﬃciently large (Theorem 8 and its 461
Corollary). 462
In our companion paper Llavador et al. (2009), we study a model which is a ramiﬁcation of 463
the model of Section 4 of the present paper, one which articulates the issue of global warming. 464
In that model, production of the consumption-investment good aﬀects negatively the quality of 465
the biosphere (carbon emissions increase global temperature), and the quality of the biosphere 466
enters into the utility of individuals. As well as a production and education sector, that model 467
also contains an R&D sector, where research produces knowledge that both improves the tech- 468
nology of commodity production, and enters directly into the utility of people. (Knowledge and 469
biospheric quality are global public goods.) We know that with appropriate parameter values, 470
the discounted utilitarian programof the more ramiﬁed model diverges; we do not know whether 471
analogues of the theorems presented here continue to hold. Naturally, we would be interested in 472
eventuallyextendingthe present analysis to that model: we propose to think of the central results 473
of the model of Section 4 as conjectures concerning the global-warming model. In particular, if 474
the discounted-utilitarian objective function diverges on the set of paths deﬁned for the global- 475
warming model, then we conjecture that the sustainabilitarian can ignore the kind of uncertainty 476
studied in the present paper (Theorem 6). However, we must say that there is another kind of 477
uncertainty, not discussed here, which is more the focus of current discussions of global warm- 478
ing: the uncertainty about the relationship between atmospheric carbon and global temperature 479
(biospheric quality). That kind of uncertainty involves quite diﬀerent considerations from those 480
studied here. 481
Appendix A. Proofs and Examples 482
Proof of Lemma 3 483




T}. For suppose this were not the case, 484




T−1}. By hypothesis, ε > 0. Deﬁne the path 485
(¯ y1, ¯ y2,...) as follows: 486









, for 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1,
¯ yt = y
R
t , for t > T.
Obviously (¯ y1, ¯ y2,...) is feasible for Program R1. In the move from (yR
1,yR
2,...) to (¯ y1, ¯ y2,...), 487
the ﬁrst T terms in the objective function of Program R1 all (strictly) increase. Furthermore, all 488
terms greater than the Tth term either increase or stay the same. Notice that ¯ yT remains at least ε
2
489
greater than the minimum of {¯ y1, ¯ y2,...., ¯ yt} for all t > T, since that minimum is bounded above 490
by min{¯ y1,..., ¯ yT−1}. So ˜ u(¯ yT) is never the minimum in any of the terms of the objective with 491
t > T. Consequently, the objective function of Program R1 (obviously bounded) attains a higher 492
value at (¯ y1, ¯ y2,...) than at (yR
1,yR
2,...) , a contradiction. 493
16Proof of Theorem 2 494
Step 0. Since ˜ u(0) is ﬁnite, w.l.o.g., we take ˜ u(0) = 0. 495
Step 1. Let (yDU
1 ,yDU
2 ,...) solveProgram DU1. Supposethereis a T suchthat yDU
t = 0. Then 496
T must be greater than one. For if yDU
1 = 0, simply deﬁne a new path (¯ y1, ¯ y2,...) by ¯ yt = yDU
t+1 for 497
all t = 1,2,... This path increases the value of the objective function in DU1, an impossibility. 498
Therefore T > 1. 499
Step 2. Now let T be the smallest date for which yDU
t = 0. Then it must be the case that for 500
any suﬃciently small ε > 0, we have ˜ u(yDU
T−1 − ε) + ϕ˜ u(ε) ≤ ˜ u(yDU
T−1), for otherwise, a transfer of 501
ε from date T − 1 to date T would increase the value of the objective function in Program DU1. 502
But this inequality can be written ϕ˜ u(ε) ≤ ˜ u(yDU
T−1) − ˜ u(yDU
T−1 − ε). Dividing both sides by ε and 503
letting ε approach zero, this implies that ϕlim
˜ u(ε)




ε = ∞, which gives the 504
desired contradiction. 505
Example 1 506
This is an example of a function ˜ u for which Program DU1 has no solution. Consider the 507
function ˜ u : ℜ++ → ℜ : ˜ u(y) =
 
e1/ydy − y. We have ˜ u′(y) = e1/y − 1, ˜ u′′(y) = −e1/y
y2 . Thus, 508
˜ u is an increasing, concave function on the positive real line, and the Inada condition holds. 509














must be strictly 512
positive because the domain of ˜ u is ℜ++. It follows that the ﬁrst-order Kuhn-Tucker conditions 513
hold –there is a number λ > 0 such that e1/yt = 1 +
 
λ/ϕt−1 
for all t. But this implies that 514
yt = 1/log
 
1 + λ/ϕt−1 








1 + λ/ϕt−1   
= 1. For 515
large t, we can approximate the denominator in the terms in this series by logλ/ϕt−1 = logλ + 516
(t − 1)log(1/ϕ). But these terms grow like k(t − 1), where k = log(1/ϕ), and so the series 517
grows like 1/(k(t − 1)), and therefore it does not converge,a contradiction. Therefore there is no 518
solution to program DU1, and hence to the Program R1, for this ˜ u. 519
The intuition here is that the derivative of ˜ u is increasing too fast (exponentially) as y ap- 520
proaches zero. Let VR (y1,y2,...) be the value of the objective function of Program R1 at 521
path (y1,y2,...). The result is perhaps surprising, because it is easy to see that the function 522
VR (y1,y2,...) is bounded on the feasible set. Hence, it must be the case for this ˜ u that the ﬁ- 523
nite supremum of
 
VR(y1,y2,...) | (y1,y2,...) is feasible
 
is never attained. It is easy to check 524
that if ˜ u(y) =
yr
r , for any r ∈ (−∞,1), then Program DU1 has a solution. The Inada condition 525
holds for these functions, and the ﬁrst order-conditions can be solved for a positive path whose 526
components sum to unity. 527
Proof of Theorem 3 528









yt ≥ 0,∀t ≥ 1.
17Step 2. Note that for suﬃciently large T, it must be the case that the solution (z1,z2,...,zT) 530
to Program DUT, which of course exists, has zT = 0. For if not, and (z1,z2,...,zT) >> 0, then 531
there are ﬁrst order conditions of the form: 532
ϕ
t−1˜ u
′(zt) = λ, some positive number λ.
Of course it follows, from the usual argument, that (z1,z2,...,zT) is a weakly decreasing se- 533
quence, and consequently, by choosing a large T, we can guarantee that zT is bounded above by 534
an arbitrarily small number, because of the cake-eating constraint. Consequently λ must be very 535
close to ϕT−1γ, and hence must be arbitrarily small. But since ˜ u′(z1) = λ, this implies that z1 536
becomes arbitrarily large, contradicting the fact that
 
zt = 1. Thus there is a date T such that 537
the solution to Program DUT has zT = 0. 538
Step 3. Now let T be the smallest date such that zT = 0; denote the solution to Program DUT
539
by (z1,z2,...,zT). We will assume that zt > 0 for t < T, but the proof can be modiﬁed in an 540
obvious way if this is not the case. Then the following Kuhn-Tucker (K-T) conditions must hold 541
for the (concave) Program DUT : 542
There are non-negative numbers λ,µT such that: 543
ϕt−1˜ u′(zt) − λ = 0, for t < T,
ϕT−1γ − λ + µT = 0.
Step 4. We claim that the path zT+1 ≡ (z1,...,zT,0) is the solution to Program DUT+1. To 544
see this, write down the K-T conditions for this program, namely: 545
There are non-negative numbers (λ,µT,µT+1) such that: 546
ϕ
t−1˜ u
′(zt) − λ = 0, for t < T,
ϕT−1γ − λ + µT = 0,
ϕ
Tγ − λ + µT+1 = 0.
We note that the values of λ and µT continue to solve these FOCs, for the vector zT+1, and 547
we deﬁne the new shadow price by 548
µT+1 = λ − ϕTγ > 0.
Thus, since we have a concave program, we have shown that zT+1 is its solution. 549
Step 5. We continue in this manner to show that the vector zS = (z,0,0,...,0) is the solution 550
for Program DUS for any S > T. The new Lagrangian multiplier at each step is deﬁned by: 551
µS = λ − ϕS−1γ,
and so we note, for use below, that limS→∞ µS = λ. 552
Step 6. We now claim that the vector (z∞
1 ,z∞
2 ,...) ≡ (z,0,0,....) solves Program DU1. 553
We proceed by contradiction. Denote by VDU(y1,y2,...) the value of the objective function 554
of Program DU1 at the path (y1,y2,...). Suppose the claim were false, and there is a path 555





. Write yt = z∞
t + gt for all t; of course, 556
 





t + εgt) +
∞  
t=T
ϕt−1˜ u(0 + εgt) + λ











18Verify that H(0) = VDU(z∞) and that H(1) ≥ VDU(y1,y2,...), which follows from the fact 558
that (y1,y2,...) is feasible and that the Lagrangian multipliers are all non-negative. Suppose we 559
can show that H is maximized at zero: then we will know that H(0) ≥ H(1), which implies that 560
VDU (z∞) ≥ VDU (y1,y2,...), which is the desired contradiction. 561
Step 7. It therefore remains to show that zero maximizes H. Note that H is a concave 562















Grouping together all terms associated with the same gt, we see that for t < T, the coeﬃcient 564
of gt is ϕt−1˜ u′(z∞
t ) − λ = 0, and for t ≥ T the coeﬃcient of gt is ϕt−1γ − λ + µt = 0. Thus the 565
derivative vanishes at zero, as required. 566
Step 8. There is a ﬁnal, transversality condition: We must show that the function H is well- 567
deﬁned on the interval [0,1]. The only term that might cause concern is the last one, which is 568
ε
 ∞
t=1 µtgt. But since µt → λ and gt → 0 and
 ∞
t=T gt = −
 T−1
t=1 gt, it follows that
 ∞
t=1 µtgt 569
converges, and the proof is complete. 570
Step 9. The uniqueness of the solution follows from the strict concavity of ˜ u. 571
Proof of Theorem 4 (The Turnpike Theorem) 572
The program 573
Recall that we aim at ﬁnding the maximum level of sustainable utility for a fairly simple 574










t, t ≥ 1,
(P3) (sk
t)θ(xc
t)1−θ ≥ ct + it, t ≥ 1,
(P4) (1 − δ)sk
t−1 + it ≥ sk
t, t ≥ 1.
The initial endowment is a vector (xe
0, sk
0). 577
Thevaluefunctionofthe programmaps the initial endowmentinto thevalue Λ; thus we write 578
V(xe
0, sk
0) = Λ. 579








= Λ}. This is the set of initial endowments that generate 580
the same value for SUS2. 581
We deﬁne a feasible path as a set of sequences {xe
t}t=0,1,2....,{sk
t}t=0,1,2.... and all other variables 582
beginning at t = 1, such that inequalities (P2), (P3), and (P4) hold. Denote the set of feasible 583
paths by P. 584





Proposition 1. The set P is a closed convex cone. The set P(xe
0, sk
0) is closed and convex. 586
Proof. Easy. 587
Proposition 2. At any solution to Program SUS2, all the constraints (P1)-(P4)bind at all dates. 588
The solution to SUS2 is unique. 589
19Proof. Step 1. It is obvious that (P2)-(P4) bind. What requires proof is that u(ct, xl
t) = Λ for all 590
t. We ﬁrst prove this is the case for t = 1. Suppose, to the contrary, that at an optimal solution, 591
u(c1, xl
1) > Λ. Reduce xl
1 by ε and increase each of xe
1 and xc
1 by ε
2 so that u(c1, xl



























1 ) >> (xe
1, sk




1 ) , for the program beginning at date 2, the value of the program 595
beginning at date 2 is greater than Λ, since the value function of the program is homogeneous 596
of degree one in its endowment vector. Let the value of the program, beginning at date 2, be 597
Λ∗ > Λ. We have now produced a feasible path where for all t, u(ˆ ct, ˆ xl
t) ≥ min(Λ′,Λ∗) > Λ. This 598
contradiction proves that u(c1, xl
1) = Λ. 599





= Λ, but there 600
is an optimal solution for which u(cT, xl
T) > Λ. Reduce xe
T−1 by ε/ξ and increase xl
T−1 by the 601




T by ε, and let this decrease be implemented by decreasing xl
T by ε, which 603
may be chosen small enough that utility at date T is still greater than Λ. We have now produced 604
an optimal path for the program for which u(cT−1, xl
T−1) > Λ, which contradicts the induction 605
hypothesis. This proves that for all t, ut = Λ. 606
Step 3. We next show that the solution to SUS2 is unique. Any two solutions must have the 607
same values of {(ct, xl
t)}: for if not, take any non-trivial convex combination of the two solutions, 608
producing another optimal solution for which the constraints (P1) do not bind (using the Cobb- 609
Douglas form of u); this contradicts what has been proved above. In like manner, the values 610
{(xe
t, sk
t)} must be the same in the two solutions, since otherwise a convex combination of them 611
would produce an optimal solution in which the constraints (P3) do not bind. But if the dated 612
capital-stocks are identical in the two solutions, so must be the dated investments. Since the 613
values {(xc
t, xl
t)} are identical in the two solutions, we see, by iteration, that the values of {xe
t} are 614
also identical. This proves the claim. 615
Proposition 3. 616









B. Along the optimal path beginning at (xe
0, sk







0j) ∈ Fκ be an inﬁnite sequence of points in Fκ, for some ﬁxed κ, such that 619
xk
0j → ∞. Then sk


















Since P is a cone, and the utility of Generation t is homogenous of degree 1 in its arguments, it 622

















0). Let the value of the program be 624
κ. By Part A, the value of the sub-program that begins at date T is strictly greater than κ. This 625
contradicts the fact that the constraints (P1) are binding for all t. 626
20C. Suppose the premise were false; then there is a subsequence sk
0j → S > 0, some S. We 627
can choose a number ˆ S > S and a number ˆ x such that V(ˆ x, ˆ S) = ˆ κ > κ. We can also choose an 628
index j such that the programbeginning with the endowments (xe
0j, sk
0j) possesses a feasible path 629
that, at its ﬁrst step, has three properties: 630
(i) sk
1 > ˆ S,
(ii) xe
1 > ˆ x,
(iii) cα
1(xl
1)1−α > ˆ κ.
(This is obvious from examining the technology.) It therefore follows that V(xe
1, sk
1) > ˆ κ: invoke 631
Part A of this proposition. But this is a contradiction, because V(xk
0j, sk
0j) = κ < ˆ κ. 632
Sinceall theconstraintsofSUS2 bind,wecanwritedowntheKuhn-Tuckerconditionsforthis 633







































The other Kuhn-Tucker conditions just deﬁne the various Lagrangian multipliers, which are 636
all non-negative. 637
It follows that: A feasible path and a number κ for which all the primal constraints bind at 638
all t, and for which (D1) ,(D2) and (D3) hold, is an optimal solution.7
639
The stationary ray 640
We ask: Is there a ray of initial endowments in ℜ2
+ for which the optimal solution is station- 641
ary, that is, for which all variables are constant over time? We study this by writing down the 642
primal constraints and equations (D1) and (D2) for a hypothetical stationary ray, and see what 643
they imply. Indeed, we can solve them: there is a unique such ray for the initial condition. The 644
ray passes through the following point: 645
x
e
0 = 1, s
k
0 = (ξ − 1)
 
ξθ






α(1 − θ)(ξ + δ − 1)
α(1 − θ)(ξ + δ − 1) + (1 − α)(ξ + δ − 1 − ξδθ)
.
Indeed, we can compute the values of all the variables on this ray. Call these the stationary state 646
values. Of course they are deﬁned up to a multiplicative constant. Let us denote this ray by Γ. 647
7One may ask, conversely: Does the optimal solution have to satisfy these equations? The answer to this must be
aﬃrmative: there is an inﬁnite dimensional version of the Kuhn-Tucker theorem, using the Hahn-Banach theorem, which
tells us that this is so.
21The Turnpike Theorem 648
It is very diﬃcult to actually compute the optimal path, if we begin from an endowment 649
vector oﬀ the stationary ray Γ. We shall, however, prove (Proposition 4 below) that from any 650
initial vector (xe
0, sk
0), the optimal solution to SUS2 converges to a point on Γ. 651















and is ﬁnite. Then the solution converges to the stationary state values. 654






by ¯ λ. We ﬁrst argue that ¯ λ , 0. If 655
¯ λ = 0, then lim
 
c/xl 
t = ∞. By (D1), lim(xc/(c + i))t = 0, and so lim
 
xc/sk 
t = 0, by invoking 656







, so limθ(ct + it)/sk











t = ∞. 658
Therefore ¯ λ > 0. 659






= κ for all t. Therefore lim xl
t = κ¯ λα and so limct = κ¯ λα−1. From 660









= 1; therefore lim
 
(c + i)/sk 
t has the value of the 661
ratio of (c + i)/sk in the stationary state. Therefore lim
 
xc/sk 
t has the same value as the ratio of 662
those variables in the stationary state. By (D1) it now follows that ¯ λ is also the ratio of xl/c in 663
the stationary state. 664
Step 3. Suppose that there were a subsequence of {sk




t is ﬁnite, it follows that the same subsequence of {xc
t} diverges to inﬁnity. It fol- 666
lows from (P2) that the same subsequence of {xe
t} diverges to inﬁnity. In particular, there exists 667




0). But this contradicts Part B of Proposition 3. Therefore 668
the sequence {sk
t} is bounded. It immediately follows that the sequence {xc




t exists and is ﬁnite; and since lim
 
(c + i)/sk 
t also exists and is ﬁnite, the sequence 670
{it} is bounded. 671
Thus all the sequences of variables, except possibly for {xe
t}, are bounded. Therefore we 672
can choose a single subsequence of all the variables (except possibly of {xe
t}) which convergesto 673
values(¯ sk, ¯ xc,¯ i)andwehavealreadyshownthat{xl
t},{ct}convergetovalues ¯ xl and ¯ c. Furthermore 674
we know that {sk





has the value of the 675
same ratio in the stationary state and {ct} converges to a positive number. 676
It now follows, by invoking Proposition 3, Part C, that {xe
t} does not divergeto inﬁnity –since 677
(xe
t, sk
t) ∈ Fκ for all t. So there is a subsequence of the original sequence such that all variables 678
converge. 679
We proceed to show that this subsequence of variables converges to stationary state values. 680
Denote the limits: 681
















We have shown that ¯ λ1 and ¯ λ2 are the values of the corresponding ratios in the stationary 682





2 − it → ¯ c. (A.3)
Notethatequations(A.1)and(A.3)comprisetwo simultaneousequations,in thelimit, forthe 684
limits of the variables xc andi. Hencethe sequences{xc
t} and {it} must converge,and to stationary 685
state values, since these same two equations hold for the stationary state variables. We therefore 686
have, by (A.2), that {sk
t} also converges to the appropriate stationary state value. Likewise with 687
{xe
t}. 688
Finally, indeed the whole sequence of variables converges to the same stationary state: for if 689
not, there would be another limit point approached simultaneously by some other subsequence 690
of the variables, to a stationary state. But since the stationary ray is unique, that limit of (xe
t, sk
t) 691
must also be on the ray Γ. However, we cannot have two subsequences approaching diﬀerent 692
points on the ray: that would violate Proposition 3, Part B. 693
Proposition4. From any initial vector (xe
0, sk




Step 1. On the optimal path, the sequence {( xl
c )t=1,2,...} does not diverge to inﬁnity. Suppose it 697
did diverge to inﬁnity. Then from (D1), the sequence xc
t/(ct + it) diverges to inﬁnity also. But, 698
invoking (P3), xc






, and so xc
t/sk








so it follows that θ(ct + it)/sk
t diverges to inﬁnity. But this contradicts (D2), for it would mean 700
that eventually the ratio xl
t/ct is negative. 701
Step 2. Hence it follows that, on the optimal path, the sequence {( xl
c )t=1,2,...} has a (ﬁnite) 702
limit point. If the sequence {( xl
c )t=1,2,...} indeed converges to this limit point, then the theorem is 703
proved, by Lemma 6. 704
Step 3. Thus, the remainder of the proof will show that the limit point of the sequence 705
{( xl
c )t=1,2,...} is unique, and hence it is the limit of the sequence. 706





























      .
It will be convenient to deﬁne the function: f ∗(x) = ax(1 − bxr), where a =
ξ



















dx2 = −rab(1+r)xr−1, and so f ∗ is a concave functionon ℜ+. Let A∗ be the value 710
of the ratio xl
c in the stationary state. Then we have: f ∗(A∗) = A∗ and f ∗(0) = 0. The ﬁrst claim 711
follows since the equation (D2∗) holds, of course, at the stationary state as well. 712
Finally, note that another root of f ∗ is given by x∗ = (1/b)1/r. Concavity implies that f ∗ has 713
only the two ﬁxed points 0 and A∗. 714














t, and deﬁne 716
σ = liminf yt, σ∗ = limsupyt.
Since f ∗(yt) = yt+1, we have inf f ∗(yt) = σ, and by the continuity of f ∗, inf f ∗(yt) = f ∗(inf yt) = 717
f ∗(σ) = σ, so σ is a ﬁxed point of f ∗. In like manner, σ∗ is a ﬁxed point of f ∗. 718
If we can establish that σ , 0, then we must have σ = A∗ = σ∗, and hence the limit of {yt} 719
exists. But this is established by an argument that mimics Step 1 of the proof of Lemma 6, as 720
follows. 721
If σ = 0, then, by (D1), liminf (xc/(c + i))t = 0, and so liminf
 
xc/sk 
t = 0, by invoking 722







, so liminf θ(ct + it)/sk
t = 0, which means, by (D2), that 723
liminf yt+1/yt = ξ/(1 − δ) > 1, because ξ > 1. But this immediately implies that liminf yt > 0, 724
a contradiction. Therefore σ , 0, and Proposition 4 is proved. 725
The proof of the Turnpike Theorem follows from the previous discussion, in particular from 726
propositions 2 and 4. 727
Proof of Theorem 5 728
Part A 729
Step 1. Let xe
0 = 1. We claim that for any small ε > 0, we can ﬁnd values σ and i such that: 730
i = (ξ − ε + δ − 1)σ,
i = f ((ξ − ε)σ,ε).
By plotting the graphs of these two functions in (σ,i) space, we can observe that they cross 731
at the origin and at some positive value of i –by assumption A(b). 732
Step 2. Let ε < (ϕξ − 1)/ϕ, and let σ be chosen to satisfy the equations in Step 1, thus 733
deﬁning investment at date 1 when 734
xc
1 = ε, xe
1 = ξ − ε, c1 = 0 = xl
1.
Note from Step 1 that we may take sk
1 = (ξ − ε)σ. Let V(xe
0, sk
0) be the value function of 735
Program DU2[xe
0, sk
0], if it converges. Then we must have, by consideration of the choice of date 736
1 values above, V (1,σ) ≥ 0 + (ξ − ε)ϕV (1,σ). But (ξ − ε)ϕ > ξϕ − (ξϕ − 1) = 1, implying 737
that the last equation stated cannot hold, and hence Program DU2 must diverge beginning with 738
endowment (1,σ). 739
Step 3. It immediately follows that Program DU2 divergesfor ˆ σ > σ. (Just throw away some 740
capital at date 1 and reduce the capital-labor ratio to σ.) Moreover,the programmust diverge for 741
0 < ˆ σ < σ as well (at date 1, invest very little in education,thus increasing the capital-laborratio 742
at date 2 to a value sk
1/xe
1 ≥ σ). 743
Part B 744
Step 1. Let xe
0 = 1. The largest possible investment that can be made at date 1 if sk
0 = σ is 745
given by I(σ), deﬁned by the equation: 746
f((1 − δ)σ + I(σ),ξ) = I(σ),
24because xc
1 ≤ ξ. Deﬁne σ∗ such that: 747
f((1 − δ),
ξ
σ∗)/(ξ − (1 − δ)) = 1 − f1((1 − δ)σ∗,ξ),
where f1(s, x) =
∂f
∂s(s, x). A monotonicity argument, invoking the intermediate value theorem, 748
shows that σ∗ exists uniquely. 749
Let m = f1((1 − δ)σ∗,ξ) and note that 0 < m < 1. 750
Step 2. The graph of the function 751
z(i) = f((1 − δ)σ∗ + i,ξ)
lies everywhere on or below the graph of the function 752
y(i) = f((1 − δ)σ
∗,ξ) + mi,
and y(0) = z(0) (by the concavity of f). The second graph meets the 45o ray in (i,y) space at the 753





Step 3. Hence, beginning at sk
0 = σ∗: 755
sk
1 ≤ (1 − δ)σ∗ + I(σ∗) ≤ (1 − δ)σ∗ + f((1 − δ)σ∗,ξ)/(1 − m)








where N ≡ u(f(σ∗,1),1). 757
Step 4. For any number ψ > 1, we have: 758
f((1 − δ)ψσ∗ + ψI(σ∗),ξ) < f((1 − δ)ψσ∗ + ψI(σ∗),ψξ) = ψI(σ∗).
Consider the function Ψ(x) = x − f((1 − δ)ψσ∗ + x,ξ); note that Ψ′(x) > 0 (since m < 1). 759
We have (from the above) that Ψ(ψI(σ∗)) > 0, and by deﬁnition, Ψ(I(ψσ∗)) = 0. It follows that 760
I(ψσ∗) < ψI(σ∗). 761
Step 5. Now compute that 762
s
k




1) ≤ (1 − δ)ξσ∗ + I(ξσ∗) ≤ (1 − δ)ξσ
∗ + ξI(σ
∗),
= ξ((1 − δ)σ∗ + I(σ∗)) ≤ ξ2σ∗,
which follows by invoking the deﬁnition of I( ), and steps 3 and 4. 763
By induction we have sk
t ≤ ξtσ∗. But xc
t ≤ ξt and xl

















(ϕξ)t−1 N < ∞. 765
Step 6. Now suppose that σ > σ∗; let σ = ψσ∗, ψ > 1. Then beginning at sk
0 = σ: 766
s
k
1 ≤ (1 − δ)σ + I(σ) = (1 − δ)ψσ
∗ + I(ψσ
∗)
< ψ((1 − δ)σ∗ + I(σ∗)) [by Step 4]
≤ ψξσ∗ = ξσ.
25And so u(ct, xl
t) ≤ u(f(sk




Step 7. Therefore DU2 converges for σ ≥ σ∗. A fortiori, it converges for σ < σ∗, by the free 768
disposal of capital. 769
Proof of Lemma 4 770
For any (u1,u2,...), min{u1,...,ut} ≥ min{u1,...,ut+1}. Therefore 771
∞  
1
ϕt−1 (1 + (t − 1)β)min{u1,...,ut} 6 u1
∞  
1
ϕt−1 (1 + (t − 1)β)
= u1[ϕ0 + ϕ1 + ϕ2 + ϕ3 + ...














































t=1 ϕt−1[1 + (t − 1)β]min{u1,...,ut} of nonnegativeterms converges. 772
Proof of Theorem 6 773
Consider the constrained discounted utility program CDU2[ϕ, xe
0, sk
0] (which specializes pro- 774








t) subject to :
(1 − δ)s
k
















t) ≥ u(ct+1, xl
t+1), t ≥ 1.
Note that Program CDU2 is not concave, because of the last constraint, which is not quasi- 776
concave. (The last constraint is quasi-concave only if u is linear.) Hence we cannot immediately 777
use concave optimization theory to analyze Program CDU2. 778
Lemma 7. The solution to R2[ϕ, xe
0, sk
0] is also the solution to CDU2[ϕ, xe
0, sk
0]. 779
26Proof. Immediate from Lemma 5. 780
But the solution to CDU2 is in general diﬀerent from the solution to DU2, the last being 781
sometimes unbounded, while CDU2 is surely bounded. 782
Now if DU2[ϕ, xe
0, sk
0] diverges, then utility is unbounded above over time. It seems reason- 783
able to conjecture that, in this case, the last constraint of CDU2[ϕ, xe
0, sk
0] will bind at every date. 784
But if this is the case, then the solution to CDU2[ϕ, xe
0, sk
0] is just the solution to SUS2[xe
0, sk
0], 785
which means that the egalitarian ethical observer in the environment with uncertain worlds will 786
behave just as if there were no uncertainty. 787
















   subject to:
λ1 ≡ 0,
(vt) u(ct, xl
t) ≥ Λ − λt, t ≥ 1,
(mt) λt+1 ≥ λt, t ≥ 1,
(at) f(sk
t, xc
t) ≥ ct + it, t ≥ 1,
(bt) (1 − δ)s
k
t−1 + it ≥ s
k






Dual variables are stated to the left of the constraints. The primal variables in Program PP 789
are all the usual economic variables, plus the variables Λ,λ2,λ3,.... We call the usual economic 790
variables of a feasible path in Program PP the economic part of the path. Note that PP is a 791
concave program, so it may be solved with traditional methods. 792
Lemma 8. Let (xe
0, sk
0) ∈ Γ.9 If ϕξ ≥ 1, then the solution to Program SUS2[xe
0, sk
0] forms the 793











. These are: 797




(SUS2) (∂ct) : vtu1[t] = at,
(SUS3) (∂xl
t) : vtu2[t] = dt,
(SUS4) (∂sk
t) : at f1[t] + bt+1(1 − δ) − bt = 0,
(SUS5) (∂it) : at = bt,
(SUS6) (∂xc
t) : at f2[t] = dt,
(SUS7) (∂xe
t) : ξdt+1 = dt,
9Recall the deﬁnition of Γ in the statement of the Turnpike Theorem.
27where we use the notation u1[t] ≡ ∂
∂ctu(ct, xl




t), etc. At the solution to SUS2, 798
non-negative dual variables satisfying the above conditions exist and all the primal constraints 799
are binding. Denote the primal (economic) variables at the solution by
 









∈ Γ, then, because the solution is stationary, u1[t] = u1[1] for all t, and likewise for the 801
other derivatives of u. and f. 802
Step 2. Deﬁne ˆ λt = 0, for all t ≥ 1. We wish to show that ˆ Φ =
 








the solution to Program PP[ϕ, xe
0, sk
0]. Let Φ = (Λ,{ct, xt,...}∞
t=1,{λt}∞
t=1) be the purported optimal 804
path for Program PP[ϕ, xe
0, sk
0]. Denote the diﬀerence between these two paths by: 805
∆Λ = Λ − ˆ Λ, ∆ct = ct − ˆ ct, ∆xt = xt − ˆ xt,..., ∆λt = λt − ˆ λt = λt,
that is, schematically, ∆Φ ≡ Φ − ˆ Φ. 806
Deﬁne: 807
ˆ at = at/(1 − ϕ), t ≥ 1,
ˆ bt = bt/(1 − ϕ), t ≥ 1,
ˆ vt = vt/(1 − ϕ), t ≥ 1,
ˆ dt = dt/(1 − ϕ), t ≥ 1.
Now deﬁne the following function of a real variable: 808
Θ(ε) =










u(ˆ ct + ε∆ct, ˆ xl
t + ε∆xl

























(1 − δ)(ˆ sk
t−1 + ε∆sk











t−1) − (ˆ xe
t + ε∆xe
t) − (ˆ xc
t + ε∆xc





All the variablesin this functionare deﬁnedexceptforthe sequenceof numbers(m1,m2,...). 809
Note that Θ is a concave function, a consequence of the concavity of u and f. Note that Θ is 810
deﬁned on [0,1], since the feasible set of Program PP is convex. Suppose we can producea non- 811
negative sequence (m1,m2,...) such that the derivative of Θ exists and is zero at ε = 0. Then Θ 812
will be maximized at zero, and so in particular, Θ(0) ≥ Θ(1). Now note that Θ(0) =
ˆ Λ
1−ϕ, which 813
is the value of the objective function of Program PP at the path ˆ Φ; all the other terms vanish, 814
since all the primal constraints of Program SUS2 are binding on this path, and ˆ λt = 0 for all t. 815
We also have: Θ(1) = Λ
1−ϕ −
 ∞











proving that the value of the objective function of Program PP at ˆ Φ weakly dominates the value 817
at any other feasible path, and hence ˆ Φ is a solution to Program PP. 818
Step 3. We now evaluate Θ′(0), by taking the derivative of Θ w. r. t. ε term by term, 819
gathering terms together. Indeed, what we are doing is re-deriving the Kuhn-Tucker conditions: 820
28we are goingthroughthis process because there is a step at which we must deviatefrom the usual 821
procedure. We compute: 822
Θ′(0) = ∆Λ









      +
∞  
1

























































Notice that all terms on the r. h. s. of this equation except the last bracketed term vanish by 823
conditions (SUS1)-(SUS7)of Step 1, and the deﬁnition of the ˆ dual variables. Furthermore, it is 824
legitimate to collect and recombine terms as we have, because all the relevant series converge. 825
The point at which care must be taken is not to attempt to recombineterms in the bracketedterm, 826
because the series in the bracketed term may not converge. 827
Step 4. It follows that we will have shown Θ′(0) = 0 if we can produce a non-negative
sequence (m1,m2,...) such that
∞  
1







ˆ vt∆λt = 0,
which is the same equation as: 828
∞  
1






ˆ vtλt = 0, (A.4)
since ∆λt = λt for all t ≥ 1. 829
If the sequence(λ1,λ2,...) is identically zero, then obviouslyanychoice of (m1,m2,...) will 830
guarantee (A.7). So suppose this is not the case. Then for some T ≥ 1, (λT+1 − λT) > 0 (recall 831
that λ1 = 0) and all terms (λt+1 − λt) ≥ 0 (see the constraint in Program PP). Consequently, by 832
choosing mT ≥ 0 appropriately, and mt = 0 for all t , T, we can make the sum
 ∞
1 mt(λt+1 − λt) 833










λt(ˆ vt − ϕt−1) ≤ 0. (A.5)
Note that both series on the l. h. s. of (A.5) converge,since (λ1,λ2,...) is bounded above by 835
Λ (since if λt > Λ for any t, then one can replace λt with Λ, and the new path remains feasible 836
while the objective function of Program PP increases), and ˆ vt is a geometric series convergingto 837
zero (see below), so it is permissible to add these two series together term-wise. 838
We now invoke the premise that the solution ˆ Φ is stationary. Using this fact, we can solve the 839






Now observe that 841
∞  
2

























29where the last inequality follows because ϕξ > 1.10 Note that the terms in this sum are surely 842
positive for small values of t (at least for t = 1), but eventually they turn negative and stay 843




which becomes negative at some t because (ξϕ)t−1 grows without bound. 845







. We have shown that
 ∞
2 ζt < 0. Let T be the largest 846



















where we have invoked the fact that (λ1,λ2,...) is a weakly increasing non-negative sequence. 848
This proves (A.5), and hence the lemma, except for the case ϕξ = 1. 849
If ϕξ = 1, then ζt = 0 for all t, and (A.5) obviously holds. 850
Lemma 9. If the solution to Program SUS2[xe
0, sk














Proof. Denote the solution to Program SUS2 by ˆ Φ, as in the proof of Lemma 8. Denote the 853
solution to Program CDU2 by ˜ Φ = {˜ ct, ˜ xt,...}. We can extend the path ˜ Φ to a feasible path for 854
Program PP by deﬁning ˜ Λ = ˜ u1 and ˜ λt = ˜ u1 − ˜ ut. The path ˆ Φ is extended in like manner to a 855
feasible path for Program SUS2 (and in fact its solution path, by the premise) by letting ˆ λt = 0 856
for all t. If the solution to Program CDU2 were not the economic part of the solution to Program 857













for the left-hand side of this inequality is the value of PP, by the premise of the lemma, and the 859
right-hand side is the value of the objective of PP at a non-optimal, feasible solution. But note 860








However the solution to SUS2 –path ˆ Φ– is a feasible path for CDU2; thus, the last equation 862
contradicts the optimality of the ˜ Φ path for CDU2 . This contradiction proves the lemma. 863
Lemma 10. Let (xe
0, sk
0) ∈ Γ. If ϕξ ≥ 1, then the solution to Program R2[ϕ, xe
0, sk




Proof. Follows immediately from lemmas 7-9. 866
10We deal with the boundary case ϕξ = 1 below.
30We now proceed to the proof of Theorem 6. 867




ϕt−1 (1 + (t − 1)β) ut
subject to u ∈ P,
ut ≥ ut+1, for t ≥ 1.
Since the value of the program is ﬁnite (by Lemma 4), we can break up the series in the 869
objective function, and write it as: 870
u1 + ϕu2 + ϕ2u3 + ϕ3u4 + ...

























     .
(A.6)
Step 2. Suppose, contrary to the claim, that (u∗
1,u∗





0], whose solution has constant utilities at the level denoted by Λ∗. Be- 872
cause Program DU2[xe
0, sk
0] diverges, we know by lemmas 4 and 10 that the solution to Program 873







subject to u ∈ P,
ut ≥ ut+1.
Hence, the solution to Program CDU2 is (Λ∗,Λ∗,...). The assumption that (u∗
1,u∗
2,...) is 876
not the solution to Program SUS2 then implies that (u∗
1,u∗
2,...) is not the solution to Program 877
CDU2[xe
0, sk













2,...) is feasible for Program SUS2 and the solution to that program is unique), i. e., 879
the ﬁrst term in (A.6) evaluated at (u∗
1,u∗
2,...) is less than Λ∗
1−ϕ. 880
Step 3. The proof will be completed after showing that (A.7) implies that the value of the 881
objective function of Rβ at (Λ∗,Λ∗,...) is higher than at (u∗
1,u∗
2,...), and, hence, (u∗
1,u∗
2,...) 882
does not solve Rβ, contrary to hypothesis. If β = 0, then from (A.6) the value of the objective 883





t, by (A.7) less than
 ∞
1 ϕt−1Λ∗, which is the desired 884
contradiction. So let β > 0. Again by (A.7), the ﬁrst term of (A.6) is less than Λ∗
1−ϕ. Suppose now 885
that the second term in (A.6) evaluated at (u∗
1,u∗
2,...) is greater than β
ϕ
1−ϕΛ∗, which, because 886



















contradicting (A.7). Thus, u∗
1 < Λ∗ and, therefore, by Lemma 5, u∗
t ≤ u∗
1 < Λ∗ for all t, and 889






t, which is less than or equal to β
ϕ
1−ϕΛ∗. By induction, we see that for all values 891









Hence, (Λ∗,Λ∗,...) dominates (u∗
1,u∗
2,...) in Program Rβ while satisfying its constraints, a 893
contradiction which establishes the theorem. 894
Proof of Theorem 7 895
Step 1. It is obvious that if ϕ = 0, then the solution to Program R2 requires simply maximiz- 896
ing the utility of the ﬁrst generation. In particular, this will require xe
1 = 0 and hence u2 = 0. 897
Step 2. More generally, suppose that in the solution to Program R2, we have u1 = u2 > 0. 898
Then if we reduce xl
2 by ξε, we can increase xl
1 by ε. This leaves all variables after date 2 899
unchanged, since Generation 2 continues to pass down the same endowment to Generation 3. It 900


























    
therefore proves the theorem. 904
Proof of Theorem 8 905
Step 1. Without loss of generality, we assume that xe
0 = 1, and so sk
0 = σ0. Since the set of 906
feasible paths is a convexcone, the primal variables at the solution of the general problem where 907
xe
0 , 1 are simply the ones computed here, multiplied by xe
0. 908










(C1) : (1 − δ)sk












(C4) : it ≥ 0. (et)
32The Kuhn-Tuckerconditionsfor a solution to this programwhere all the constraints bind are: 910
(KT1) (∂ct) : ϕt−1u1[t] = bt,
(KT2) (∂xl
t) : ϕt−1u2[t] = dt,
(KT3) (∂xe
t) : dt = (1/ξ)t−1d1,
(KT4) (∂xc
t) : btf2[t] = dt,
(KT5) (∂sk
t) : (1 − δ)at+1 = at − bt f1[t],
(KT6) (it) : at = bt − et,
where all equations hold for t = 1,2,3,.... Again, uj[t] and fj[t] are the jth partial derivatives 911
of the utility function u and the production function f for j = 1,2. 912
We will show that there exist non-negativedual variablessuch that the proposedpathsatisﬁes 913
all the Kuhn-Tucker constraints. All the relevant inﬁnite series converge, so that the satisfaction 914
of the K-T constraints suﬃces to prove optimality of this inﬁnite program. 915
Step 2. Our method will be to substitute the values on the proposed solution path into the 916
primal and dual constraints, and to show that non-negative values of all dual variables can be 917
computed. To this end, the educational constraint (C3) gives us: 918






0 = 1. 919
Step 3. The dual K-T constraints imply the following: 920
u2[t] = f2[t]u1[t], (A.10)
ϕξu2[t + 1] = u2[t], (A.11)
et − (1 − δ)et+1 = (1 − f1[t])bt − (1 − δ)bt+1. (A.12)
The remaining dual constraints simply deﬁne (non-negative)values of the dual variables. 921



















Equations (A.12) and (A.13) comprise two linear equations in (xc
1, xl
1), which solve to give 924
xc
1 = ˜ xc
1, xl
1 = ˜ xl
1,
as required. 925
Step 5. We next analyze equation (A.12), which says: 926
(ϕξ)













33Substituting in the values ˜ ct and ˜ xl







which solves to give the prescribed value for E. Note that E < 1 since ϕξ < 1. 928
Step 6. The prescribed values of all primal variables have been veriﬁed. The Kuhn-Tucker 929
equations (KT1-3) give us non-negative solutions for bt and dt. It is left only to solve for et and 930
to show that for all t, bt ≥ et, which will give non-negativevalues for at. 931
Step 7. Deﬁne the new variables: 932
mt = (1 − f1[t])ϕt−1u1[t] − (1 − δ)ϕtu1[t + 1].
We show in this step that there exists a number ˆ σ such that if σ0 ≥ ˆ σ, then mt ≥ 0 for all 933
t ≥ 1. The desired result is equivalent to: 934
(∀t ≥ 1) 1 − θ






    
1−θ






1−δ < 1, the l. h. s. of (A.14) is increasing in t; thus we need only verify (A.14) for t = 1, 935












an inequality which holds for suﬃciently large σ if and only if: 937





which is immediately seen to be true from the deﬁnition of E. 938
Step 8. Now note that equation (A.12) can be written 939
et − (1 − δ)et+1 = mt, t ≥ 1.
This system of diﬀerence equations yields the following solution: 940
eT =
e1
(1 − δ)T−1 −
T−1  
t=1
mt(1 − δ)t−T, T = 2,3,...
Now choose e1 =
 ∞
t=1(1 − δ)t−1mt. (We note that this series converges.) To verify that eT ≥ 941
0 for all T ≥ 1 we must show that 942




a fact which follows from the deﬁnition of e1 and the fact that (m1,m2,...) is a non-negative 943
sequence. 944
34Step 9. The ﬁnal step is to show that at ≥ 0 where at = bt − et. It suﬃces to show that for all 945
T ≥ 1, (1 − δ)T−1bT ≥ (1 − δ)T−1eT, or that: 946




The r. h. s. of this inequality can be shown (with some algebra) to equal 947




since bT = ϕT−1u1[T], our desired inequality reduces to showing that 948
((1 − δ)ϕ)
T−1u1[T] ≥
? ((1 − δ)ϕ)
T−1(1 − f1[T])u1[T] − a positive term,
which is surely true. This concludes the demonstration that all the K-T conditions hold with the 949
dual variables as deﬁned. 950
Step 10. Finally, we derive the critical value σ∗. The inﬁnite-series expression for e1 can be 951
expanded and reduced (with much algebra) to show that 952
e1(σ0) = (1 − f1[1])u1[1] −











αθ 1 − α
1 − αθ
, (A.15)
which we write as a function of the initial capital-labor ratio. The reader should note, from 953
the K-T conditions (KT1-6) in Step 1 that the dual variables are functions only of the marginal 954
utilities and productivities at the various dates, which are, for the Cobb-Douglas case, functions 955
of ratios of the primal variables. Therefore the dual variables are independent of the scale of the 956
endowment vector (i. e., the value of xe
0). 957
The critical value of σ0 is that number σ∗ for which e1(σ∗) = 0: for if e1(σ0) > 0 then a 958
slight decrease in σ0 will still deliver a positive value of e1, and all the other et. But this would 959
mean that investment is identically zero on the optimal path. The zero of equation (A.15) is the 960
solution to the equation in the statement of the theorem, which concludes the proof. 961
Example 2 962
This is an example of an education and capital economy where, along the solution path to 963
Program DU2, u2 > u1, whereas the utilities from date 2 onwards decay geometrically. The 964
example is presented in lemmas 11 and 12 below. 965
Lemma 11. Let (α, θ, δ, ξ,ϕ) = (0.66,0.25,0.1,1.1,0.9)and (xe
0, sk
0) = (1,0.15). In particular, 966





1) = (0.192294,0.0482943,0.870989,0.154375,0.0746361,0.114795). We have 968
σ1 = 0.1979 > σ∗ and the variables from date 2 onwards are given by: 969
t ≥ 2 : it = 0, sk
t = xe
1˜ sk
t, xt = xe
1˜ xt,ct = xe
1˜ ct. In particular, u1 = 0.1138 and u2 = 0.1169 > u1. 970
The utilities from date 2 onwards decay geometrically as in Theorem 8. 971
Proof. Step1. We will produce the example by ﬁnding an initial endowment vector (xe
0, sk
0) such 972
that σ0 < σ∗ and the solution to DU2[ϕ, xe
0, sk
0] has the following property: on the optimal path, 973
at date 1, we have σ1 = sk
1/xe
1 > σ∗. For we then know what the optimal path is from date 1 974
onwards: it is just the path stipulated in Theorem 8. Our strategy will be to ﬁnd such values of 975
(xe
0, sk
0), where, on the optimal path, we have u1 < u2. 976
We write down the programwe wish to solve, where (xe
0, sk










t) subject to :
(at) (1 − δ)s
k
t−1 + it ≥ s
k
t, t ≥ 1,
(bt) f(sk
t, xc
t) ≥ ct + it, t ≥ 1,
(dt) ξxe
t−1 ≥ xt ≡ xe
t + xl
t + xc
t, t ≥ 1,
(et) it ≥ 0, t ≥ 1.
Note that we have factored out ϕ from the usual statement of the objective function. Of 978
course this makes no diﬀerence to the solution. The reason for doing so will become apparent 979
momentarily. 980
We are searching for a solution such that σ1 > σ∗, i1 > 0, and it follows (by Theorem 8) 981
that it = 0,t ≥ 2. Hence all constraints of program PP∗ will bind except for the ﬁrst investment 982
constraint. This gives the following K-T conditions: 983
(∂ct) : ϕt−2u1[t] = bt, t ≥ 1,
(∂xl
t) : ϕt−2u2[t] = at, t ≥ 1,
(∂xc
t) : bt f2[t] = dt, t ≥ 1,
(∂xe
t) : ξdt+1 = dt, t ≥ 1,
(∂it) : a1 = b1,
at = bt − et, t > 1,
(∂s
k
t) : (1 − δ)at+1 = at − bt f1[t], t ≥ 1.
Step 2. In Theorem 8, we solved the DU2 problem with the normalization xe
0 = 1,σ0 = sk
0. 984
Recall from Step 10 of the proof of Theorem 8 that the values of the dual variables of that 985
program are functions only of σ0: that is, they depend only on the capital-labor ratio at date 0, 986
not on the scale of the initial endowment vector. 987
Step 3. Program PP∗ beginning at date 1 (not date 0) is exactly the program solved in The- 988
orem 8. (That is why we factored out ϕ from the objective.) Since σ1 > σ∗ in the solution 989
we are looking for, it follows that the dual variables from date 1 on in Program PP∗ are exactly 990
the dual variables computed in Theorem 8, where the initial capital – labor ratio is σ1, and the 991
primal variables from date 1 are exactly the tilde primal variables of Theorem 8, multiplied by 992
xe
1, whatever that turns out to be. 993
Denote the dual variables computed in the proof of Theorem 8 with tildes –˜ at(σ), ˜ bt(σ), etc., 994
where σ is the initial capital-labor ratio of that program. 995
Step 4. We now compute what information is contained in the K-T constraints for Program 996
PP∗. First, we know that d2 = ˜ d1(σ1): this follows from the above discussion. But d2 = 1
ξd1 = 997
ϕ−1u2[1] and therefore: 998
u2[1] = ϕξ ˜ d1(σ1). (A.16)






, and we therefore can 999











    , (A.17)
where c1, xl
1 are the date 1 values on the optimal path for Program PP∗. 1001
















= (1 − θ)







    
θ
. (A.18)
The next three equations simply restate the primal constraints: 1004
(1 − δ)sk









1) = c1 + i1. (A.21)
Equation (A.21) comes from the (∂sk
1) K-T condition. As before, we know that b2 = ˜ b1(σ1) 1005
and e2 = ˜ e1(σ1) and so a2 = b2 − e2 = ˜ b1(σ1) − ˜ e1(σ1). Thus, we may write that K-T condition 1006
as: 1007
(1 − δ)(˜ b1(σ1) − ˜ e1(σ1)) = αϕ−1






    
1−α 
     1 − θ







    
1−θ
     . (A.22)
The six equations (A.17)-(A.22)are equations in the six unknowns xe
1, xl
1, xc




0) is given. Of course, σ1 = sk
1/xe
1. We knowthe expressions for all the tilde 1009
variables from Theorem 8, as functions of σ1. 1010
Indeed,thesesix equationscontainall thenewinformationaboutthesolutiontoProgramPP∗
1011
–the remaining K-T conditions simply emulate the solution of the program from date 1 onwards, 1012
which we know from Theorem 8. 1013










Note that equations (A.17), (A.18) and (A.22) above are simultaneous equations in the three 1015
unknowns A, B and σ1. Hence we can solve for these three variables (which we will do in an 1016
example, given below). Now, knowing these three variables, we can write all the information re- 1017





0 + i1 = sk
1,
xc











37We write these equations in matrix form Mz = Q, where 1019
M =

                       
0 0 0 −σ1 0 1
0 0 0 0 −1 1
−1 0 f(B,1) 0 −1 0
−1 A 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 B 0 0 −1

                       
,Q =











                       
.




1).) Hence we can compute the solution z = 1020
M−1Q. If we insert an endowment vector (xe
0, sk
0) with σ0 < σ∗ and the solution Q generated is 1021




1 ≥ σ∗, then we have a solution to PP∗ of the required form. For it will 1022
immediately follow that all the dual variables are non-negative, from the K-T conditions, and so 1023
we have produced a path where all the K-T conditions hold —by again invoking Theorem 8. 1024
Step 5. Examine the Mathematicaprogram(available fromthe authors)which calculates this 1025
solution for several numerical values. In particular, an instance is provided in which u1 < u2 on 1026
the optimal path, which proves the lemma. 1027
Lemma 12. The solution to R2[ϕ, xe
0, sk









= (0.167583, 0.0325828, 0.131227, 0.847974, 0.162572, 0.894544, 1029
0.197627) and for t > 1: it = 0, sk
t = xe
1˜ sk
t, xt = xe
1˜ xt, ct = xe
1˜ ct. At the solution, u1 = u2. Indeed, 1030
the utilities at the solutions of DU2 and R2 for this economy are given by: 1031
u1 u2 ut,t > 2
DU2 0.1138 0.1169 geometric decay
R2 0.1152 0.1152 geometric decay
1032
Proof. Step 1. We will ﬁnd a solution to Program PP[ϕ, xe
0, sk
0]: this will also be a solution to 1033
CDU2[ϕ, xe
0, sk
0] and hence to R2[ϕ, xe
0, sk















   subject to
(vt) u(ct, xl
t) ≥ Λ − λt, t ≥ 1,
(mt) λt+1 ≥ λt, t ≥ 1,
(bt) f(sk
t, xc
t) ≥ ct + it, t ≥ 1,
(at) (1 − δ)sk
t−1 + it ≥ sk





t, t ≥ 1,
(et) it ≥ 0, t ≥ 1,
where λ1 ≡ 0. For the speciﬁed economy, we conjecture a solution where u1 = u2 > u3 > ... 1035
and where the geometric-decay solution begins at date 2. Thus, of the set of mt constraints, only 1036
the m1 constraint will bind, and so mt = 0 for t > 1. The e1 constraint will be slack, since we 1037









(∂λ2) : −ϕ + m1 + v2 = 0,
(∂λt) : vt = ϕ
t−1, t > 2,
(∂ct) : vtut = bt, t ≥ 1,
(∂x
l
t) : vtut = dt, t ≥ 1,
(∂xc
t) : bt f2[t] = dt, t ≥ 1,
(∂x
e
t) : ξdt+1 = dt, t ≥ 1,
(∂sk
t) : at+1(1 − δ) − at + bt f1[t] = 0, t ≥ 1,
(∂i1) : a1 = b1,
(∂it) : at = bt − et, t > 1.
Step 2. We can reduce the ﬁrst three dual K-T conditions to the equations: 1040
v2 = 1 + ϕ − v1, m1 = v1 − 1,
thus eliminating the variables v2 and m1. We must, after ﬁnding a value for v1, check that v2 and 1041
m1 are non-negative. 1042
For t ≥ 2, we deﬁne all the dual variables to equal the dual variables of the geometric-decay 1043
solution which begins at date 2 with the endowment (xe
1, sk
1), multiplied by λ. Denoting the latter 1044
variables with tildes, we therefore deﬁne for t ≥ 2: 1045
at = ϕ˜ at−1, bt = ϕ˜ bt−1, dt = ϕ ˜ dt−1, et = ϕ˜ et−1.
Then all the dual constraints which involve these variables are satisﬁed where the primal 1046
variables for dates t ≥ 2 are given by the geometric-decay solution to Theorem 8. For this to 1047
be a solution, we must check that σ1 ≡ sk
1/xe
1 ≥ σ∗. We are left only with the dual constraints 1048





a2(1 − δ) = b1(1 − f1[1]).
The ﬁrst two of the above constraints simply deﬁne b1 and d1. Thus we are left with three 1050
substantive equations. Substituting in for the values of d2 and a2, these become: 1051
u2[1] = f2[1]u1[1], (A.23)
ϕξ ˜ d1 = v1u2[1], (A.24)
ϕ(˜ b1 − ˜ e1)(1 − δ) = v1u1[1](1 − f1[1]). (A.25)
39Recall from the proof of Theorem 8 that the expressions for ˜ d1, ˜ b1, ˜ e1 are known functions of 1052
σ1 ≡ sk
1/xe
1. In particular, we have: 1053
˜ b1 = α






    
α−1
, ˜ d1 = (1 − α)






    
α
,
while the expression for ˜ e1 is given as equation (A.15) in Step 10 of the proof of Theorem 8. 1054
In addition we have the primal constraints: 1055
u(c1, xl
1) = xe
1u(˜ c1(σ1), ˜ xl























Step 3. We proceed to solve these equations as follows. Recall that A = c1/xl
1, B = sk
1/xc
1. 1058
Rewriting equation (A.23) as 1059
1 − α
α
A = (1 − θ)B
θ, (A.30)





We deﬁnethefollowingmapping. Beginwithanarbitrarypositivevaluefor B. Thencompute 1061
A by (A.31). Now equations (A.24) and (A.25) comprise two simultaneous equations in (σ1,v1). 1062
Solvethem. Thisleaves uswith thefourequations(A.26)-(A.29),whicharenowlinearequations 1063





We now have a linear system of six equations in the six date-one primal variables. Solve 1065
them, and deﬁne ˆ B = sk
1/xc
1. A ﬁxed point of the mapping B → ˆ B generates a solution to the 1066
seven equations (A.23-A.29) in the six primal variables plus v1. 1067
We ﬁnd the ﬁxed point of this mapping for the stipulated economy. (See the available Math- 1068
ematica program.) We ﬁnd that v1 = 1.01304, and it follows that v2 and m1 are positive and 1069
σ1 = 0.1976 > σ∗. Hence we have a solution to all the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, and hence, 1070
since PP is a concave program, to Program PP. The solution is reported in the lemma’s state- 1071
ment. 1072
Proof of Theorem 9 1073
Step 1. We ﬁrst write down the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for a solution to Program g-SUS. 1074
(∂Λ) : 1 =
 ∞
1 rt(1 + g)t−1,
(∂ct) : rtu1[t] = at,
(∂xl
t) : rtu2[t] = dt,
(∂xe
t) : ξdt+1 = dt,
(∂xc
t) : at f2[t] = dt,
(∂sk
t) : at f1[t] + (1 − δ)bt+1 = bt,
(∂it) : at = bt.
40In addition, let all the primal constraints hold with equality. We shall attempt to solve all 1075
these equations for a balanced growth path. 1076
On such a path, uj[t] = uj[1] and fj[t] = fj[1] for j = 1,2 and t ≥ 1. The primal and dual 1077
equations yield the following substantive relations on a balanced growth path for the economic 1078
variables: 1079
i1 = (g + δ)s
k
0, (A.32)















1) = c1 + i1. (A.36)
The other dual constraints simply deﬁne non-negative dual variables in terms of the primal 1080
variables, with one exception: we must verify that the series in the (∂Λ) constraint converges. 1081
Thus, giveng, if we can solve the ﬁve equations(A.32)-(A.36)for(sk
0, xc
1, xl
1,c1,i1) and the series 1082
in (∂Λ) converges,then the balancedgrowthpath at rate g deﬁned by these values, along with the 1083
associated dual variables, solves the Kuhn-Tuckerconstraints. Modulo transversality conditions, 1084
which we will comment upon below, and since g-SUS is a concave program, the theorem will be 1085
demonstrated. 1086







. Consequently the 1087
series in the (∂Λ)K- T conditiondeﬁnes a valuefor d1 if andonly if
1+g
ξ < 1. This is true because 1088
by hypothesis, g < ξ − 1. 1089
Step 3. Thus, it remains to solve the ﬁve equations (A.32)-(A.36). Specializing to Cobb- 1090
Douglas, we re-write the ﬁve equations as follows. 1091
i1 = (g + δ)sk
0, (A.37)




























    
1−θ
=





1)1−θ = c1 + (g + δ)sk
0. (A.41)









. Solve (A.39) and (A.40) for X and Y: 1092



















= (1 + g)θX1−θ − (g + δ), (A.42)
41which generates a necessary condition: 1094
(1 + g)
θX
1−θ > (g + δ). (A.43)














= XY, where Z ≡ (1 + g)
θX





Z . Using (A.38), and substituting this value for xc






(ξ − (1 − δ)).
Consequently, from (A.38), xc
1 = XY
XY+Z(ξ − (1 − δ)). Thus both xc
1 and xl
1 are positive numbers. 1097
We can now use the equations to solve quickly for positive values of sk
0,i1 and c1. 1098
Step 5. We now verify (A.43). Deﬁne the function Υ(g) = (1 + g)
ξ−(1−δ)
θξ − (g + δ). Check 1099
that Υ(0) > 0 if and only if ξ > 1−δ
1−θδ; but this is true because ξ > 1. Check that Υ(ξ − 1) = 1100
(ξ − (1 − δ))1−θ
θ > 0. Since Υ is linear, it follows that Υ(g) > 0 on the interval [0,ξ − 1], 1101
demonstrating (A.43). 1102
Step 6. We ﬁnally remarkthat all the transversalityconditionsholdbecause each sequenceof 1103
dual variables (e. g., (a1,a2,...)) converges to zero geometrically. This proves the ﬁrst direction 1104
of the theorem. 1105
Step 7. To provethe converse, let g = ξ−1. On a balanced growth path, we therefore require 1106
xe
1 = (1 + g)xe
0 = ξxe
0, which implies that xc
1 = xl
1 = 0. So no balanced growth path can be 1107
supported at the rate g = ξ−1. It is obvious, a fortiori, that no such path exists for g > ξ−1. 1108
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